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SUMMARY 
 
Title: Remedies for Dissenting Shareholders: A Comparison of the Current Option of 
Personal Action and the Proposed Appraisal Remedy under the Companies Bill of 2008. 
 
 
By: A. T. Adebanjo. 
 
 
Degree: Master of Laws with Specialization in Corporate Law. 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof K. E. Van der Linde. 
 
 
Summary: The Companies Bill B61-2008 proposes to introduce appraisal rights into 
South African law. Appraisal entitles a shareholder to demand payment from the 
corporate issuer of his shares at a fair cash value in certain instances where major 
transactions which would change the company‟s direction have been proposed. It allows 
a cash exit rather than being coerced into supporting the majority‟s decision. Arriving at a 
fair share value is a challenge to appraisal. Presently, under the Personal action, a 
shareholder who opines that the company‟s act or omission is unfairly prejudicial or that 
its affairs are conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner, may apply to court for an 
appropriate order. It enables the minority to challenge the majority‟s decision. Both 
remedies will be available to dissenting shareholders under the new dispensation and a 
shareholder must decide which remedy best suits his purposes. Appraisal should be seen 
as a last resort.  
 
 
Key terms: Dissenting shareholders; Appraisal rights; Personal action; Companies Bill; 
Remedies; Section 252; Fair value; Minority protection; Unfairly prejudicial unjust or 
inequitable; Minority buy-out. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT. 
 
In company law, the business of the company is generally conducted based on the votes 
of the majority of shareholders in that company. Naturally, in some instances, their 
conduct may be to the detriment of minority shareholders in the company. It is therefore 
well in order for any company legislation to anticipate such situations and to make 
provision in one form or the other, to give respite to minority shareholders. 
 
The respite currently available to individual minority shareholders in South African 
company law is the personal action. A personal action may be instituted by an aggrieved 
member against the company for the wrong done to that member or a group of members. 
The personal action is presently enshrined in section 252 of the Companies Act.
1
 By 
virtue of section 252(1), any member of a company may make an application to the court 
for an appropriate order if he believes that an act or omission of the company is unfairly 
prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or some members of the company or that the 
company‟s affairs are being conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial, unjust 
or inequitable to them. Further specific circumstances under which such a member may 
make an application are set out in section 252(2), which will be discussed below.
2
 
 
The aim of a personal action is to protect minority shareholders who otherwise would be 
left completely at the mercy of the decisions or failure to act of the majority. It enables an 
aggrieved member to in certain instances seek redress against the decision-makers of the 
company in his own interest or in the interest of a group of members to which he belongs. 
The availability of this remedy will not only serve to reverse some decisions already 
taken but could also serve as a deterrent to the majority. 
 
Of particular interest to this study is appraisal, which is another remedy available to 
minority shareholders in a company. Although currently not available in South African 
company law, appraisal rights have been in existence in other jurisdictions like the United 
States of America and New Zealand. Appraisal, also known as dissenters rights, share-
purchase remedy, minority buy-out or minority buy-back, could be defined as any 
                                               
1 Act 61 of 1973, hereafter referred to as “the Companies Act” or “the Act”. 
2 See paragraph 3.0. 
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provision in company legislation giving an aggrieved shareholder the right to demand 
payment from the corporate issuer of his shares at their fair cash value.
3
   
 
It would appear that appraisal rights have been in existence long before the enactment of 
a set of rules expressly providing for appraisal.
4
 The courts in some earlier cases allowed 
aggrieved shareholders to sue for the value of their shares where the majority had sold all 
of the corporation‟s assets, or merged it with another corporation, or where the majority 
had exceeded their lawful powers, on the grounds that their interest had been converted. 
However, the manner of resolving these disputes was anything but satisfactory to either 
party i.e. the company on one side and the aggrieved shareholder on the other. It seemed 
safer for the company to compromise quietly than risk having the transaction set aside or 
enjoined after costly preparation. Again the shareholder instituted the action at great cost 
and the outcome was mostly uncertain. It was in order to find a balance between these 
opposing sides that appraisal statutes were enacted.
5
 
 
There are three basic justifications for the introduction of the remedy.
 6
 They are:  
 
i. to compensate the minority for the loss of their veto power; 
 
ii. to enable a cash exit instead of being coerced to take up stock in a new entity; 
 and, 
 
iii to protect the majority by expediting corporate transactions. 
 
The Companies Act is currently under review and a new Bill
7
 has been passed by 
Parliament and is awaiting the President‟s assent. Once passed it is expected to come into 
operation in South Africa in 2010. The aim of the Bill is to improve company legislation 
in South Africa and a major feature is the inclusion of appraisal rights for dissenting 
shareholders. This remedy is enshrined in clause 164 of the Bill. 
 
                                               
3 See Paine S.J. “Achieving the Proper Remedy for a Dissenting Shareholder in Today‟s Economy: Yuspeh 
v Koch” Winter 2005 (vol. 65) no.2 Louisiana Law Review 911.  
4 See Lattin N.D. “Remedies for Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes” (1931) vol. XLV no. 2 
Harvard Law Review 233 at 234.  
5 Ibid at 236-237. 
6 See Hagan K. J. “First Western Bank Wall v Olsen: An interpretation of „Fair Value‟ for Minority Shares 
as Found within the South Dakota Dissenter‟s Rights Statutes” (2003) Vol. 48 South Dakota Law Review 
83 at 89-90. 
7 Bill B61D of 2008, hereafter referred to as “the Companies Bill” or “the Bill”. 
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It is pertinent to note that the personal action remains preserved under the Bill by virtue 
of clause 163. Clause 163 provides for a personal action similar to, but much wider in 
scope than that currently found in section 252 of the Companies Act. This shall be further 
dealt with in the course of this study.
8
 
 
The effect of the introduction of clause 164 is that in addition to the personal action, 
minority shareholders in South Africa will now have the opportunity to offer up their 
shareholding for sale to the company and opt out of the business venture where they are 
of the opinion that their interests will not be furthered or will be otherwise affected by an 
act or omission of the majority.  
 
Clause 164 sets out in detail the circumstances under which a member may demand 
appraisal and the dynamics governing this remedy. The proposed appraisal clause will be 
analysed in the course of this study.
9
 
 
The object of this study is to make a comparison between the personal action under 
section 252 of the Companies Act and the proposed appraisal rights under clause 164 of 
the Companies Bill, with a view to determining the plausible effects which the 
introduction of appraisal will have on company law and practice in South Africa. 
 
2.  OTHER POSSIBLE REMEDIES. 
 
As stated earlier, the personal action and appraisal form the focus of this research. It must 
be noted however that there are a number of other actions which members may resort to 
and it is in order to briefly highlight these. 
 
a). Derivative action 
 
The common law derivative action is instituted in respect of unratifiable wrongs by a 
member acting on behalf of all shareholders, except the wrongdoers, where the company 
cannot or does not act against them.
10
  In such a situation, the plaintiff must join the 
company as nominal defendant, making it a party to the proceedings; hence, any order 
                                               
8 See paragraph 4.0. 
9 See paragraph 5.0. 
10 See Cilliers H. S., Benade M. L., Henning J. J., Du Plessis J. J., Delport P. A., De Koker L. & Pretorius J. 
T. Corporate Law 3rd edition Butterworths 2000 at 300. 
et al supra at 302-303. 
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made becomes applicable to it. It has been submitted that the procedure to be followed 
under common law is uncertain in South Africa.
11
 Further militating against the 
derivative action at common law is the fact that the member initiating the proceedings 
under common law bears the cost of litigation and if successful, the benefits thereof 
accrue to the company, not to him personally.
12
 
 
The statutory derivative action is enshrined in section 266 of the Companies Act. It may 
be instituted by a member against a director or other officer
13
 of the company if the 
company has suffered damages or loss, or has been deprived of any benefit as a result of 
any wrong, breach of trust or breach of faith committed by the said wrongdoers.
14
 The 
member must first serve a written notice on the company calling on it to initiate such 
proceedings within one month from the date of service and that failing which, he shall 
initiate the proceedings.
15
 Should the company fail to initiate the proceedings, the 
member may make an application to the court for an order appointing a curator ad litem 
to institute and conduct the proceedings on behalf of the company, which order the court 
may grant if it is satisfied such order could be granted.
16
 On the return day, the court may 
discharge the provisional order, or confirm the appointment of the curator ad litem and 
issue the appropriate directions as it may deem fit.
17
  
  
The basis of instituting this type of action is different from that of a personal action or 
appraisal. This type of action may be instituted if it can be proved that the company has 
suffered damages or loss or has been deprived of any benefit owing to a wrong, breach of 
trust or faith committed by a past or current director or officer and it failed to institute 
proceedings to seek redress. Here, unlike in a personal action or appraisal, a member 
need not be personally involved in litigation but need simply initiate proceedings for the 
appointment of a provisional curator who reports his findings to the court and the court if 
satisfied, appoints a curator ad litem who then institutes proceedings against the said 
wrongdoers. 
                                               
11 Ibid at 305. 
12 Ibid at 305. 
13 Past or present. 
14 See section 266(1). 
15 See section 266(2)(a). 
16 See section 266(2)(b). 
17 See section 266(4). 
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b). Private action 
 
Aptly named by Cilliers et al
18
, this remedy is available to a member in his private 
capacity for the enforcement of rights in his private capacity and not as a member. For 
example, a member may also be an officer of the company and thus, the need may arise 
to enforce his fees or claim damages stemming from a wrong done to him personally. 
This clearly differs from a personal action where a member may make the application in 
his capacity as a member of the company on his own behalf as well as on behalf of other 
members of the company. It also differs from appraisal in that an application for appraisal 
stems from an individual‟s membership of a company.  
 
c). Application for Inspection of the Company‟s Affairs. 
 
Section 257 of the Act empowers the Minister on the application of members, to appoint 
an inspector to investigate affairs of a company and to report thereon. The application 
may be made by not less than one hundred members or members holding not less than 
one-twentieth of issued shares, in the case of a company with share capital, and in the 
case of a company without share capital, by not less than one-tenth of the number of 
persons on the register of members. The Minister may then make an application to the 
court for an appropriate order, based on the inspector‟s report.19   
 
 
3.  THE PERSONAL ACTION UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 61 OF 1973. 
 
The remedy presently available to individual dissenting shareholders in South Africa is 
the personal action and it is provided for by section 252 of the Companies Act and at 
common law. I focus on the statutory personal action. 
 
An individual member of a company may make an application to the court for an 
appropriate order where such member is of the opinion that a particular act or omission of 
the company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the 
company are being conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or 
                                               
18 Ibid at 299, to avoid confusing it with either personal action or derivative action. 
19 See section 262 (1).  
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inequitable to him or to some members of the company.
20
 This first part of this statement 
is self-explanatory. An application may be filed not only on the basis of a specific act, but 
also as a result of the inactivity or failure to act of the company. An applicant must be a 
formally registered member of the company. Thus in Lourenco v Ferela (Pty) Ltd (No. 
1)
21
 where the applicants had inherited shares but had not yet received the shares and had 
not been formally registered as members, the court held that they had no locus standi to 
make the application for relief. 
 
Section 252(2) also refers to certain specific circumstances. These are where the act in 
question relates to the following: 
 
a).  alteration of the memorandum of the company; 
 
b).  reduction of the company‟s share capital;  
 
c).  variation of rights attached to shares; and   
 
d). conversion of a private company into a public company and vice versa under 
 section 22.   
  
In the event of acts specifically listed under subsection 2, the application must be made 
within six weeks of the date on which the said special resolution was passed
22
. 
 
Section 252(3) empowers the court to make such order as it deems fit. Such an order may 
be for regulating the future conduct of the company‟s affairs. In Heckmair v Beton & 
Sandstein Industrieë (Pty) Ltd
23
, it was reaffirmed that the court can make an order for 
the future regulation of the management of the company‟s affairs. The order may also be 
for the purchase of a member‟s shares by other members or by the company itself, in 
which case an order need be made also for the reduction of the company‟s capital or 
otherwise.
24
  
 
Where the court‟s order is for the alteration of, or addition to the memorandum or articles 
of the company, by virtue of section 252(4)(a), such alteration or addition will subject to 
                                               
20 See section 252(1). 
21 1998 (3) SA 281 (T). 
22 See section 252(2). 
23 1980 (1) SA 350 (SWA). 
24 See section 252(3). 
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subsection (b), have effect as if it was duly made by special resolution of the company. 
Section 252(4)(b) provides that the company shall have no powers whatsoever except as 
otherwise provided in the order, to make any alteration in or an addition to its 
memorandum or articles which is inconsistent with the order made, except with the leave 
of the court. 
 
Section 252(5) mandates the company to lodge an order which alters or adds to or which 
grants leave to alter or add to the company‟s memorandum or articles with the Registrar 
in the prescribed form within one month of the making thereof, failing which, the 
company shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
In a nutshell, a minority shareholder may be able to seek relief statutorily against a 
company if he is able to satisfy the requirements set out in section 252, which relief is 
completely at the discretion of the court. This discretion is of such a nature that even if it 
appears to be just and equitable to grant the relief sought, the court still retains an 
unfettered discretion to grant the relief or to refuse to do so.
25
 It must be emphasized that 
section 252 does not in any way abolish the personal action under common law. It is an 
additional remedy and does not in any way encroach on majority rule.
26
 
 
It is in order to briefly examine the position under the 1926 Companies Act
27
 which 
preceded the 1973 Act. Section 111bis of the 1926 Act also provided for the protection of 
minority shareholders. However, there are notable differences between section 111bis 
and the current section 252. For instance, section 111bis provided that the facts must be 
such as to justify the making of a winding up order on the ground that it is just and 
equitable for the company to be wound up but that to wind it up however would unfairly 
prejudice the applicants. Also, under section 111bis, it was necessary to show that the 
affairs of the company were being conducted in a manner which was “oppressive” to 
some members of the company. The difficulty posed by the latter requirement was not 
farfetched. It was difficult to fathom exactly what would amount to oppression and it 
appeared the courts were not always consistent in determining the meaning of oppression. 
 
                                               
25 See section 252(3). 
26 See Cilliers et al at 314. 
27 Act 46 of 1926. 
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At the introduction of a new companies Act,
28
 a new section, section 252, was included to 
provide for members personal remedy. Section 252 was enacted to among other things, 
mitigate the hardships experienced under section 111bis.  The requirements of oppression 
and the facts being those that justify winding up under section 111bis were excluded. In 
place of oppressive conduct, section 252 required “unfairly prejudicial, unjust or 
inequitable conduct” which appears to have a much wider range of acts than the former. 
However, it has been submitted
29
 that the test of unfairness is objective and it is necessary 
yet again to have a wider interpretation to provide adequate protection for minority 
shareholder and further
30
 that an applicant must establish a lack of probity or fair dealing 
or an obvious departure from the standards of fair dealing, or a violation of the conditions 
of fair play on which every shareholder may rely; it must be conduct which departs from 
the accepted standards of fair play, or which amounts to an unfair discrimination against 
the minority. 
 
What would amount to “unfair”, “unjust”, or “inequitable” is determined by an objective 
test, and completely at the discretion of the court. In Barnard v Carl Greaves Brokers 
(Pty) Ltd,
31
 the applicant was a shareholder and director of the defendant company. 
Relations between him and other shareholders deteriorated over time and consequently, 
he convened a meeting, offering to sell his shares to them. Shortly after the said meeting 
however, he was served with a notice of intention to institute proceedings for his removal 
as a director of the company. The applicant was suspended as a director and denied 
access to the company‟s offices, its staff and business connections. The locks to the 
company‟s premises were changed. He was given a notice of meeting shorter than was 
statutorily required, the agenda of which included a waiver of the shareholders‟ 
agreement, his removal as director and from all official positions within the company. 
The Applicant also received a demand that he pay a huge amount allegedly due in respect 
of his loan account in the company‟s books, but was denied access to any information to 
confirm this unsubstantiated claim. He received inadequate notice to appear before a 
                                               
28 Act 61 of 1973. 
29 See Pretorius J. T., Delport P. A., Havenga M., Vermaas M: Hahlo’s South African Company Law 
through the Cases 6th ed Juta 1999 at 403. 
30  Ibid at 316. 
31 2007 JDR 0047 (C) 2. 
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disciplinary enquiry and his request for postponement was rejected and was subsequently 
informed by letter of his dismissal as an employee of the company. The applicant filed 
amongst other things, an application for the provisional winding up of the defendant and 
in an amended notice of motion, sought in the alternative, an order directing the other 
members of the company to purchase his shares, which is an order made under section 
252 of the Companies Act.  Although the amended notice of motion was not expressly 
premised on section 252, due to the premise on which the relief sought was based i.e. 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable conduct; the court rightly based the alternate 
relief sought as an application under section 252. In determining which conduct would be 
said to be unfair, unjust or inequitable, the court held that it was not enough for the 
applicant to show that he was unhappy in his relationship with other shareholders and 
desired to withdraw from the company.
32
 Rather, it found acts which could come under 
this description to include the following:
33
 
 
i. excluding a member from the management of the company against his will, in a 
 manner inconsistent with the spirit and provisions of the shareholders‟ 
 agreement; 
 
ii the manner in which a shareholders‟ meeting had been convened on improperly 
 short notice, the business at which, was to remove the applicant as a director of 
 the company; 
 
iii. the way in which a disciplinary enquiry was convened; 
 
iv. the company‟s demand for payment of the applicant‟s loan account; 
 
v. the instruction by management of the company‟s auditor to refuse applicant 
access to financial information which he reasonably required to confirm his 
account with the company; and, 
 
vi. the manner in which applicant‟s peaceful possession of his office at the 
company‟s premises was disrupted. 
 
                                               
32 See page 26, para 45. 
33 See pages 26-27, para 45. 
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In the above case, it was the company‟s contention that the applicant was personally 
responsible for the breakdown in relations between the parties, having failed to apply 
himself to his duties. The court found this argument unconvincing because there was 
previously no evidence of any complaint against the applicant prior to his expressing the 
desire to withdraw from the company. Rather, he had been awarded a salary increase. 
 
On what would be a standard case of unjust, inequitable or unfair treatment, the court 
further quoted Lord Hoffman in O’Neill and Another v Phillips and Others,34 which was 
an appeal before the House of Lords against an application under the English equivalent 
of section 252
35
 thus: 
“… shareholders have entered into association upon the understanding that 
 each of them who has ventured his capital will also participate in the 
 management of the company. In such a case it will usually be considered unjust, 
 inequitable or unfair for a majority to use their voting power to exclude a member 
 from participation in the management without giving him the opportunity to 
 remove his capital upon reasonable terms.” 
 
In a nutshell, it would be unjust, inequitable or unfair where the majority in a company 
deliberately wields its voting power to prevent the minority from taking part in its 
management and yet, does not allow him to have his contribution back. 
   
In Steyl v Du Plessis and Others,
36
 the court reaffirmed the position of the law that the 
court‟s order should be one which is aimed at bringing to an end the act or omission 
complained of. In order to achieve this aim, the order of the court should bear directly or 
indirectly on the perpetrator of the oppression. 
 
It is submitted at this juncture that an act or omission which may qualify as adversely 
affecting a shareholder‟s right may not necessarily be unfair, unjust or inequitable, such 
that it could be the basis of an application under section 252. The decision of the majority 
ordinarily prevails, as long as it can be established that such act is not illegal. Thus, a 
lawful and honest decision of the majority which results in a decrease in the value of the 
company‟s shares, for example, is an act adversely affecting the member‟s shareholding. 
                                               
34 (1999) 1 WLR 1092; (1999) 2 All ER 961. 
35 Section 459 of the English Companies Act 1985 (Chapter 6 of 1985). This Act has however been 
replaced by the Companies Act 2006 (Chapter 46 of 2006).  
36 2004 JDR 0594 (C) 2. 
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However, it may not necessarily be classified as unfair, unjust or inequitable. This is 
where the discretion of the court will come into play, taking into consideration all the 
circumstances of the case. 
 
It must be noted that section 252 will not apply to a future act i.e. an act which has not yet 
been carried out; an act which is still being contemplated. In Porteus v Kelly
37
, the 
applicant applied to court for an interdict to restrain the respondent from calling a 
meeting and passing a particular resolution. The court held that something to be done in 
future, as in the instant case was not yet an act within the ambit of section 252. In the 
same vein, an act or omission of an officer of the company but which is not an act or 
omission of the company would also not come under the ambit of section 252
38
. 
 
Although section 252 (just like its predecessor, section 111bis) was designed to protect 
minority shareholders, the courts have held that a major shareholder could also apply for 
relief in certain cases
39
.   
 
4.  THE PERSONAL ACTION UNDER CLAUSE 163 OF THE BILL. 
 
The Companies Bill also recognizes and provides for the personal action in clause 163. 
Clause 163 is similar in form to, but much wider in scope than section 252 of the Act. 
 
In terms of clause 163, a member or director of a company may apply to the court for 
relief if the company or a related person‟s act or omission is oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial to or unfairly disregards his interests; or the business of the company or a 
related person is carried on in an oppressive or unfairly prejudicial manner to the 
applicant‟s interests; or the powers of the directors, prescribed officers of the company or 
a related person are exercised in an oppressive or unfairly prejudicial manner to the 
applicant or unfairly disregards his interests. Just as it obtains under section 252, the court 
retains the discretion under clause 163 to make any order as it deems fit and clause 
163(2) proceeds to list an array of possible orders. 
 
                                               
37 1975 (1) SA 219 (W). 
38 See Kennedy v Micro Design (Pty) Ltd 1995 (1) Commercial Law Digest 67 (W). 
39 See Benjamin v Elysium Investments (Pty) Ltd 1960 (3) SA 467 (E). 
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It is clear from the above that the aim of the Companies Bill is not to exclude the personal 
action but rather to also afford aggrieved shareholders the option of appraisal if they so 
wish. 
 
5.  APPRAISAL RIGHTS UNDER CLAUSE 164 OF THE COMPANIES BILL. 
 
Clause 164 provides that an aggrieved shareholder may under certain circumstances 
demand to be paid the fair value for his shares. The circumstances under which a member 
may invoke clause 164 are:  
 
1. Where a company proposes to amend its Memorandum of Incorporation in any 
 manner adverse to the rights or interests of holders of any class of shares;
40
 or  
 
2. Where it proposes to enter into any of the transactions considered under Clause 
 112, 113 or 114.
41
  
 
At this juncture, it is in order to examine in detail the provisions of clause 164. Clause 
164(2) provides that if a company gives notice to shareholders of a meeting to consider 
adopting a resolution to amend its Memorandum of Incorporation in any manner which is 
adverse to the rights or interests of any class of shareholders
42
, or to enter into a 
transaction contemplated in clauses 112, 113 or 114, the company must include a 
statement informing shareholders of their rights under the clause. These rights are 
entrenched in clause 164(3) and (5).  
 
An aggrieved member is entitled to send a written notice to the company objecting to the 
proposed resolution before its adoption.
43
 In the event that the company goes ahead to 
adopt the resolution however, every shareholder who filed an objection and who did not 
withdraw it or who voted in support of it, is entitled to receive a notice to that effect 
within ten business days.
44
 Clause 164(5) entitles dissenting shareholders who meet 
conditions stipulated therein to demand for payment of the fair value for their shares. 
 
                                               
40 Clause 164(2)(a). 
41 Clause 164(2)(b). 
42 i.e by altering the preferences, rights, limitations or others terms of class of shares.  
43 Clause 164(3). 
44 Clause 164(5). 
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In addition to amendment of the company‟s Memorandum of Incorporation, one of the 
requirements for appraisal is the company having entered into a transaction contemplated 
in clauses 112, 113 or 114. These clauses deal with proposals for the disposal of the 
company‟s assets or undertaking, proposals for a merger or amalgamation and proposals 
for scheme of arrangement respectively.  
 
Clause 112 provides for the disposal of all or the greater part of the company‟s assets or 
undertaking. A disposal is allowed only if it has been approved by shareholders in 
fulfillment of clause 115 and the company has satisfied all other requirements therein, to 
such extent as they are applicable to the disposition.
45
 A resolution under subclause 5 will 
be effective to the extent that it ratifies a specified transaction.
46
 
 
Clause 113 applies to proposals for merger or amalgamation. The import of this section is 
that where two or more companies propose to merge or amalgamate, they must enter into 
an agreement setting out the terms and means effecting the transaction and the agreement 
must be submitted for consideration at a meeting of shareholders of each company.
47
 
Notice of such meeting must be sent to all shareholders of each company. 
 
Clause 114 applies to proposals for a scheme of arrangement. It allows the company‟s 
board to propose and implement any arrangement between the company and holders of a 
class of shares. Arrangement includes a reorganization of its share capital by methods 
including consolidation of different classes of securities, division of securities into 
different classes, expropriation of securities from their holders, exchange of securities or 
a combination of these methods.
48
  
 
The underlying factor in these three instances is that a major decision is about to be taken 
or has been taken in respect of the company‟s business and/or a member‟s shareholding 
which may substantially affect the shareholder‟s interest. Clause 164 therefore 
incorporates the mechanism whereby an aggrieved shareholder has not only the option of 
a personal action under Clause 163 but also that of appraisal.   
   
                                               
45 Clause 112(2). 
46 Clause 112(5). 
47 Clause 113(4)(b). 
48 Clause 114. 
 19 
A shareholder who satisfies the necessary requirements for appraisal under clause 164(5) 
may make his demand in the form of a written notice to the company within 20 business 
days after receiving the company‟s notice under subsection 349, or in the absence of 
notice, within 20 working days after learning that the said resolution had been adopted.
50
 
 
A shareholder requesting appraisal must give in his demand, his name and address, the 
number and class of shares over which he dissents and a demand for payment of their fair 
value.
51
   
 
It must be noted that a shareholder who has sent in his demand has no further rights in 
respect of those shares other than to be paid their fair value, unless the demand is 
withdrawn before the company could make an offer, or the dissenting shareholder allows 
the company‟s offer to lapse,52 if the company fails to make an offer and the shareholder 
withdraws the demand
53
 or if the company revokes the adopted resolution which gave 
rise to the shareholder‟s rights in the first place.54 It is logical that should any of these 
situations occur, there would be no further need of appraisal. Should that be the case, the 
shareholder‟s rights would be re-instated without interruption.55 Clause 164(11) goes 
further to set out regulations and time frames to guide all parties. 
 
It is important to note that offers in respect of shares of the same class or series must be 
made on the same terms.
56
 Also, on accepting an offer, the shareholder must tender the 
share certificate to the company or its transfer agent; or in the case of uncertificated 
shares, he must take the necessary steps under clause 53 to transfer them to the company 
or its transfer agent,
57
 upon which the company must pay the agreed sum within ten 
working days.
58
 Should the company fail to make an offer, or makes one considered to be 
inadequate, the aggrieved shareholder may apply to the court to determine a fair value for 
                                               
49 Clause 164(7)(a). 
50 Clause 164(7)(b). 
51 Clause 164(8).  
52 Clause 164(9)(a). 
53 Clause 164(9)(b). 
54 Clause 164(9)(c). 
55 Clause 164(10). 
56 Clause 164(12)(a). 
57 Clause 164(13)(a). 
58 Clause 164(13)(b). An application for a deferral may be made only on the ground that payment would 
prevent the company from meeting the solvency and liquidity test.  
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his shares and for an order directing the company to pay the value so determined.
59
 In the 
event that either party applies to the court, the court has the discretion to join any other 
person to the suit as a dissenting shareholder, determine a fair value for the shares, 
appoint appraisers to assist in determining the fair value, allow a reasonable interest rate 
to accrue to the shareholder or, make an order as to costs.
60
  
 
It must be noted that the fair value for the shares in question must be determined as at the 
date on which, and the time immediately preceding the adoption of the said resolution
61
. 
Further, where the resolution in dispute was for a merger or amalgamation with other 
companies and the company at the centre of the dispute has ceased to exist, its obligations 
automatically become the obligations of the new company formed by the merger or 
amalgamation
62
.  
 
Should there be reasonable grounds to believe that a company would be unable to pay its 
debts when due, the company may apply to the court for an order varying its 
obligations.
63
 The court may then make a just and equitable order, taking the company‟s 
financial standing into consideration and ensure that the lender is paid at the earliest 
possible date. 
  
A shareholder‟s tender of shares, demand and the subsequent payment by the company 
under this clause does not in any way amount to a distribution by the company, nor 
acquisition of its own shares under clause 48 and is therefore not subject to that clause or 
application of the solvency and liquidity test by the company under clause 4.
64
 
 
Clause 164 does not apply to a transaction, agreement or offer made pursuant to a 
business rescue plan that was approved by the shareholders in terms of clause 152.
65
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
59 Clause 164(14). 
60 Clause 164(15). 
61 Clause 164(16). 
62 Clause 164(18). 
63 Clause 164(17). 
64 Clause 164(19). 
65 Clause 164(1). 
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6. AN EXAMINATION OF APPRAISAL RIGHTS  IN THE USA. 
 
Appraisal rights as a remedy for dissenting shareholders is incorporated into the company 
law statutes of all states in the United States of America.
66
 Most states formulated their 
appraisal statutes from the Model Business Corporations Act (MBCA), the scope of its 
application however varies from one state to the other. For example, application of 
appraisal is limited mostly to mergers and consolidations in California
67
 and Delaware, 
where more than half of the largest corporations in America are incorporated.
68
 The most 
common instances in which appraisal rights are exercised are mergers and consolidations, 
substantial transfers of assets in some states, dissolutions, certain amendments to 
corporate articles and some other changes that may arise.
69
  
 
The MBCA was formulated in 1928 and was originally known the Uniform Business 
Corporation Act. It was renamed the Model Business Corporation Act in 1943. The 
American Bar Association created its own MBCA in 1950 to act as a guide for all areas 
of corporate law. The MBCA has been revised on a number of occasions since then. The 
current version of the revised sections on appraisal was rewritten in 1999
70
, and the latest 
version of the MBCA was released in 2002. 
 
Although statutorily, appraisal has been in existence for a while, it has only recently 
come into regular use and this has been attributed in part to the decline in the number of 
tender offers, the increase in the incidence of mergers and the US Supreme Court‟s order 
that shareholders whose voting powers would not affect the outcome of a vote should 
seek protection in state law remedies e.g. appraisal, rather than proxy rules of the Federal 
Securities Laws.
71
 
 
                                               
66 Hagan supra at 83. 
67 Vorenberg J. “Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Shareholder‟s Appraisal Right (1964) no. 7 Harvard Law 
Re view 1189 at 1207. 
68
 Hagan supra at 93. 
69 Vorenberg supra at 1189. 
70 Aiken M. “A minority shareholder‟s rights in dissension – how does Delaware do it and what can 
Louisiana learn?” (2004) vol. 50 Loyola Law Review 231 at 236. 
71 Hagan supra at 91. 
 22 
The relevant section of the MBCA on appraisal is section 13.02(a). It provides that a 
shareholder is entitled to appraisal rights, and payment of the fair value of his shares in 
the event of any of the following:
72
    
 
1. Consummation of a merger which requires shareholder approval, and in respect of 
 which the said shareholder is entitled to vote (except with respect to any class or 
 series of shares which remain outstanding after conclusion of the merger), or 
 where the corporation is a subsidiary and the parent company is involved in a 
 merger;
73
 
 
2. Conclusion of a share exchange in which the company is the party whose shares 
 will be acquired, if the dissenting shareholder is entitled to vote on the exchange 
 (except with respect to any class or series of the company‟s shares which are not 
 part of the exchange);
74
   
 
3. A disposition of the company‟s assets, if the dissenter is entitled to vote on 
 disposition;
75
 
 
4. Amendment of the company‟s articles of incorporation with respect to a class of 
 shares which reduces the number of shares of a class owned by the dissenter to a 
 fraction of a share if the corporation has the obligation or right to purchase the 
 fractional share created;
76
 or, 
 
5. Any other amendment to the articles of incorporation, merger, share exchange or 
 disposition of assets to the extent allowed by the articles, bylaws, or a resolution 
 of the company‟s board of directors.77 
 
The various states in the US have adapted their statutes from the above section of the 
MBCA. 
 
It is interesting to note that with the exception of section 13.02(a)(2) above which 
provides for share exchanges, events which could trigger appraisal under the MBCA are 
                                               
72 See section 13.02(a) of the MBCA. 
73 See section 13.02(a)(1). 
74 See section 13.02(a)(2). 
75 See section 13.02(a)(3). 
76 See section 13.02(a)(4). 
77 See section 13.02(a)(5). 
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very similar to those that could trigger appraisal under the Companies Bill. The triggering 
acts under the section include mergers, disposal of assets and amendments of the 
company‟s articles of Incorporation. Similarly, clause 164 also provides for the same 
acts, with the exception of share exchange. In its place, clause 164 recognizes schemes of 
arrangement. 
 
 
7. APPRAISAL RIGHTS IN NEW ZEALAND. 
 
The Companies Act of New Zealand
78
 provides for appraisal as a remedy for minority 
shareholders. Appraisal rights are incorporated into New Zealand company statute by 
sections 110 to 115 of the Act. 
 
A shareholder who is entitled to vote on a particular resolution but who did not exercise 
that right may opt to have his shares purchased by the company where other shareholders 
have exercised their voting rights and passed the said resolution.
79
 The shareholder must 
give a written notice of his request to the company within ten working days of the passing 
of the resolution,
80
 and the board of the company must within twenty working days of 
receipt of such notice agree that the company purchase the shares or arrange for the 
purchase
81
 The purchase price is required to be “fair and reasonable”.82 The Act 
recognizes the accrual of interest on the agreed price.
83
 
 
A company could apply to the court for an order exempting it from the obligation to 
purchase the shares on the grounds that the purchase could be fatal for the company, it 
could not reasonably be expected to finance the purchase or that requiring it to purchase 
the shares would be unjust and inequitable
84
 and the court could make an appropriate 
order under the circumstance.
85
 
 
There were arguments that these provisions do not provide sufficient guidance or 
certainty to companies about how the share price is to be determined, neither do they 
                                               
78 Act 105 of 1993, hereafter referred to as “the Act”. 
79 Section 110. 
80 Section 111(1). 
81 Section 111(2). 
82 Section 112(2). 
83 Section 112(B)(1). 
84 See section 114(1). 
85 See section 114(2) & (3). 
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indicate the date on which the price is to be determined.
86
 The Act only requires that the 
company offer a “fair and reasonable price” to the member concerned. In Natural Gas 
Corporation Holdings Ltd v Infratil,
87
 the court criticized the lack of detail in the 
minority buy-out provisions and expressed the view that appraisal provisions needed 
urgent review to make them more beneficial and workable.  
 
It was for this purpose, among others, that the Companies (Minority Buy-out Rights) 
Amendment Act
88
 came into being. A new section 112 was formulated which requires the 
board to give notice to the shareholder within 5 working days, of its intention to purchase 
his shares.
89
 The Amendment Act provides that the method of valuation must be fair and 
reasonable and retained the default position of the law that valuation should be 
determined as a pro-rata share of the total value of the relevant class of shares, excluding 
minority discount except if the affected class is a minority class.
90
 It however allows 
resort to a different method of valuation where the default valuation method would be 
clearly unfair to either party.
91
  
 
Legal title to the shares passes to the company on the day the board gives notice of its 
offer to buy the shares.
92
 It has been argued that this would seem to give the company 
impetus to unduly prolong the offer process
93
 The Amendment Act however provides for 
recourse to arbitration should the parties fail to agree on share value.
94
 It provides for 
payment of interest on any amount which remains outstanding after the date on which it 
falls due and the rate of calculation of such interest is at the discretion of the tribunal.
95
  
 
It is submitted that the Amendment Act still retained many of the buy-out provision under 
the Companies Act but made certain remarkable changes like allowing resort to another 
method of valuation where the accepted method would be clearly unfair to one party and 
                                               
86 See the Explanatory note to the Companies (Minority Buy-out Rights) Amendment Bill. 
87 (2001) 3 NZLR 727. 
88 Act 65 of 2008, hereafter referred to as “the Amendment Act”. 
89 See section 112(1) of the Amendment Act. 
90 See section 112(2). 
91 See section 112(3). 
92 See section 112(C). 
93 See Holborow D. & Anderson S. “New Minority Buy-out Rules Pass into Law” Simpson Grierson 
Corporate Advisory October 2008 at 3 
94 See section 112(A). 
95 See section 112(B). 
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remarkably reducing the time-frame within which a company must give notice of its 
intention to purchase the shares, thereby reducing the time-frame of the whole process. It 
would appear that except for these changes, appraisal provisions under the Amendment 
Act are similar to that under Act 105 of 1993.  
 
 
8. VALUATION OF SHARES - ARRIVING AT A FAIR VALUE. 
 
Valuation of the dissenter‟s shares in the company is of paramount importance in 
appraisal. Once a member and the company have agreed on appraisal, the next pressing 
issue is how to arrive at the true value of such a member‟s shareholding in order to pay 
him off adequately without shortchanging either party to the transaction. A demand for 
appraisal by a member, or an offer of appraisal on the part of the company in itself should 
not, and does not usually resort to a deadlock or litigation.
96
 Rather, arriving at the true 
value of the shares at that period does.
97
  The underlying factor is that the value of shares 
is never static. From the time of purchase, to the time of appraisal, it keeps changing, 
depending on the company‟s performance per time. 
 
On the issue of arriving at a fair value, the Companies Bill provides for the company to 
send a written offer of an amount which the directors consider to be fair value to the 
dissenter.
98
 However, the Bill later stipulates that fair value should be determined as at 
the date on which, and time immediately before the company adopted the resolution 
which gave rise to appraisal.
99
 It is submitted that this is not adequate guidance on how to 
determine fair value. The Bill is silent on the exact method of valuation to be applied.                     
 
There was a lack of uniformity in appraisal statutes of the different states in the US under 
the old code.
100
 The stated value ranged from “actual value” to “full market value” and 
the nature of most cases precluded proof of value with mathematical precision.
101
  
 
Some appraisal statutes e.g. section 262 of the Delaware Code require that the dissenting 
shareholder be paid a fair value for his shares. The question then arises, what is fair 
                                               
96 See Hagan supra at 84. 
97 See First Western Bank Wall v Olsen 2001 S. D. 16, 621 N.W. 2d 611, Weinberger v UOP Inc 457 A. 2d 
701 (Del 1983); Cavalier Oil Corporation v Harnett 564 A. 2d 1137 (Del. 1989). 
98 Clause 164(11)(c). 
99 Clause 164(16). 
100 See Latin supra at 243. 
101 See Lattin supra at 262. 
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value? It has been submitted that “fair value” is not the “market value” and its 
determination does not include any value created from the transaction giving rise to 
appraisal e.g. new management plans.
102
 Rather, appraisal should be of the company 
exactly the way it was being run as at the time of the said transaction. The member then 
receives interest based on his percentage shareholding. 
 
In arriving at a fair value for the shares, the relevant facts and circumstances must be 
taken into consideration. In Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation v Steel & Tube Co,
103
 
the dissenting shareholders were contesting the selling price of the corporate asset. They 
alleged it was not a fair price. The appraisal had been based on replacement values. The 
court held that “sound value” was not a fair indication of the market or commercial value 
and further, the fact that they are usually quoted to potential investors did not detract 
from this conclusion. It then deducted fifty percent from the given valuation. The 
difficulty in determining the fair market value can further be seen from Jones v Missouri-
Edison Elec. Co,
104
 in which it took eleven years to determine the fair value of the 
dissenters‟ shares. Generally however, the typical duration of appraisal cases has been 
estimated to be within twelve to twenty-four months after filing the petition.
105
  
 
There are different methods of valuation. Courts in Delaware use the discounted cash 
flow (DCF) method.
106
 This is based on an assumption that the value of a company‟s 
assets is equal to the current value of the expected cash flow from those assets into the 
future. The cash which a company can generate in future is determined and then, the 
current value of that future cash is determined using a discount rate.  
 
Another method is the comparable companies method. This involves comparing the 
company with its publicly traded competitors in the same industry i.e. looking at 
particular indicators of economic performance e.g. profits, determining similar indicators 
for public companies and if the company‟s value is known, determining how 
                                               
102 See Jarvis GC “State appraisal statutes: an underutilized shareholder remedy” (May/June 2005) vol. 13, 
no.3 The Corporate Governance Advisor 16. 
103 14 Del. Ch. 64 (1923). 
104 135 Fed. 153 (E. D. Mo 1905, 144 Fed 765 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906), 199 fed. 64 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912), 203 
Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913), 233 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).  
105 Jarvis supra at 16. It must be noted that this is still considerably shorter than the duration of other types 
of complex litigation, which has been put at between three and five years 
106 Ibid at 16. 
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performance indicators compare to the company‟s share price (e.g. ratio of its share price 
to revenue) and applying the ratio to the company in question to arrive at a value.
107
 
 
A third method is a comparable transactions approach which uses multiples of valuation 
metrics (e.g. earnings and revenue), calculating them as the ratio of the transaction price 
to the metrics.
108
 
 
South Carolina has three common valuation methods which are net asset value, market 
value and discounted earnings or investment value.
109
  
 
i. The net asset value method uses the company‟s balance sheet to obtain the 
 book value of  assets; it subtracts the book value of liabilities and arrives at the 
 net asset (or equity) value of the company.  
 
ii. The market value method is in two forms. The first is the Guideline Company 
 Method (GCM), which is used to compare similar corporations while the second 
 involves the courts relying on previous sales of the shares of the closely held 
 corporation. It has been submitted that this method is unreliable because shares of 
 a loosely held corporation are rarely traded and the sale is usually between related 
 parties.
110
  
 
iii. The third method is the earnings (or investment method) which is the same thing 
 as the DCF method used in Delaware. It is premised on the  idea that the value of 
 a share is the equivalent of the current value of expected future cash flows.  
 
A leading case on the determination of fair value is First Western Bank Wall v Olsen
111
, 
which reached the Supreme Court of South Dakota. The issue for determination was what 
would amount to “fair value”. The board of directors passed a resolution to convert the 
corporation from a C corporation to a Sub-Chapter corporation, in order to allow it 
market competitiveness, flexibility and opportunity for significant taxation and other 
financial advantages. It became necessary to amend its articles of Incorporation, which 
the majority did, forcing the minority shareholders to give up their shares for 
                                               
107Ibid at 16 - 17. 
108 Ibid at 17.  
109 Hagan  supra at 99.   
110 Ibid at 99. 
111 2001 S. D. 16, 621 N. W. 2d 611. 
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cancellation, in exchange for a fair value for them. The board unanimously decided that 
the book value should be taken to be the fair value of the shares. The minority received 
payment but later demanded payment of a deficiency. The petitioner applied to the court 
for judicial valuation of the dissenters‟ fractional shares. 
 
The minority‟s expert witness submitted that the “fair value” as defined under the SDCL 
required the shares to be valued at a proportionate interest in the corporation as a going 
concern and the proposed value of the respondents‟ fractional share was higher than the 
amount paid by the Bank. The petitioner on the other hand insisted that “fair market 
value” was synonymous with “fair value” and relied on the definition given in the IRS 
Revenue Ruling 59-60,
112
 (i.e. the price at which the property would change hands 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy 
or sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts).  
 
The court refused the petitioner‟s argument and accepted the appraisal methods given by 
the respondent, on the basis that the latter‟s shares were cancelled under a “squeeze-out”. 
They could therefore not be regarded as willing sellers. It was further held that: 
i. had the legislature truly intended for the “fair value” to be the same as “fair 
 market value”, it would have expressly stated so; 
 
ii.  fair market value was an incorrect method of valuation; and  
 
iii. the application of minority and non-marketability discounts were inequitable. 
 
 Judgment was entered in favour of the respondents and the petitioner was ordered to pay 
the difference between the previously-paid amount and the newly calculated fair value. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
In Cavalier Oil Corporation v Harnett
113
, the respondent, being dissatisfied with the offer 
made by the petitioner, instituted appraisal proceedings against the corporation. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that application of a discount to a minority 
shareholder is contrary to the requirement that the company be viewed as a going concern 
and further, that refusing to give a minority shareholder the full proportionate value of his 
                                               
112 1959 – 1 C. B. 237 
113 564 A. 2d 1137 (Del. 1989). 
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shares imposes a penalty for lack of control and unjustly enriches the majority who may 
freeze out the minority in order to reap a windfall after appraisal.  
 
Another leading authority on valuation is Weinberger v UOP Inc.
114
 Prior to the case, the 
predominant theory on valuation was the Delaware block method, under which fair value 
is calculated by first assessing value to the company, based on its asset value, earnings 
value and market value and secondly, a percentage weight is given to each valuation. 
Then the weighted average of the three independent valuations is considered as the fair 
value of the company. After this case however, valuation methods were extended to 
include any techniques or methods generally considered to be acceptable to the financial 
community.  
 
It has been submitted that there is no fixed approach for determining the value of 
minority shares, since each case has unique facts. Appraisal should strive to strike a 
balance between law and equity to ensure parties are treated fairly.
115
 It is submitted that 
the court‟s approach should be founded on fairness, after duly weighing the facts and 
circumstances of each case. 
 
9. A COMPARISON OF SECTION 252 AND CLAUSE 164. 
 
It is pertinent to note that there are similarities between section 252 and clause 164, 
notwithstanding that they serve different purposes. The primary similarity between 
section 252 and clause 164 is that they both provide for alteration of the company‟s 
memorandum of incorporation. Under the Act,
116
 an aggrieved member may make an 
application for an order in the event of any alteration of the company‟s memorandum 
under section 55 or 56. Similarly, an aggrieved shareholder may demand appraisal under 
the Bill
117
 if the company is considering adopting a resolution to amend its Memorandum 
of Incorporation in any manner materially adverse to the rights or interests of holders of 
any class of shares. 
 
                                               
114 457 A. 2d 701 (Del 1983).  
115 Hagan  supra at 103. 
116 See section 252(2)(a). 
117 See clause 164(2)(a). 
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Another similarity between the two is that a personal action is instituted on the basis of an 
act or omission being adverse to the aggrieved shareholder‟s rights while appraisal may 
also be demanded on this basis. For instance, under section 252, a member may make an 
application to the court for an appropriate order if he is of the opinion that any particular 
act or omission of the company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that its 
affairs are conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to 
him or some other members. In the same vein, a shareholder may demand appraisal if the 
shareholder perceives that amendment to the company‟s Memorandum is materially 
adverse to the rights or interests of holders of any class of shares to which he belongs.
118
   
 
There are also a number of differences between the transactions under section 252 and 
some of the transactions listed under clause 164. As will be recalled, clause 164(2)(b) 
provides for appraisal should the company propose to enter into one of the transactions 
contemplated in clauses 112, 113 and 114. Clause 112 deals with the disposition of the 
assets or undertaking of a company, clause 113 provides for proposals for merger or 
amalgamation while clause 114 deals with schemes of arrangements. However, section 
252 does not expressly provide for all the transactions contemplated in clause 164(2)(b). 
Apart from section 252(2)(a) which recognizes alteration of the company‟s memorandum 
of incorporation as a basis for personal action, and is similar in form and content to 
clause 164(2)(a), which also recognizes amendment of a memorandum of incorporation 
in an adverse manner as to affect the rights or interest of shareholders of any class, all 
other transactions envisaged under section 252(2) namely alteration of the company‟s 
Memorandum; reduction of the company‟s capital; variation of share rights and 
conversion of a private company into a public company and vice versa, are completely 
different from those envisaged under clause 164(2)(b). 
 
Secondly, the powers of the court are wider under section 252. The section accords the 
court an unfettered discretion such that it may even make orders for regulating the future 
conduct of the company‟s affairs.119 However, under clause 164, the court strictly has the 
power to determine the fair value of the shares in question and to order the company to 
                                               
118 Clause 164(2)(a). 
119 Section 252(3).  
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pay it,
120
 or make an order deferring the company‟s obligation to pay, on the ground that 
it would not satisfy the solvency and liquidity test if the whole amount were to be paid.
121
 
It may also determine that any other member of the company should be made a party to 
the suit as a dissenting shareholder, it may appoint appraisers to assist in determining the 
fair value, and it may allow a reasonable interest rate on the shares and make orders as to 
cost.
122
 These duties have been expressly listed in clause 164 and must be adhered to. 
Basically, clause 164 can work without court interference. 
 
Another difference between an application under section 252 and that under clause 164 is 
that an application for personal action which falls into the category of acts listed under 
section 252(2) must be made to the court within six weeks after the date on which the 
special resolution is passed.
123
 However, whatever be the act that triggers appraisal, the 
stipulated time limit is the same. The demand must be made by a dissenting shareholder 
to the company within twenty working days after receiving the company‟s notice that the 
resolution in question has been adopted. Under clause 164(14), the aggrieved shareholder 
may only apply to the court for determination of the fair value of the shares and an order 
directing the company to pay up, should the company fail to make an offer,
124
 or he 
considers the company‟s offer to be inadequate.125 It must be noted that apart from 
section 252(2), there is no time limit to applications made under section 252.  
 
Further, an aggrieved member may resort to section 252 not only with regards to a 
particular act but also with regards to an omission.
126
 However, under clause 164, specific 
acts of the company give rise to a demand for appraisal; there is no mention of omissions. 
 
 
10. MERITS AND DEMERITS OF APPRAISAL. 
 
The all important advantage of appraisal as a remedy for dissenting shareholders is that it 
affords a minority shareholder the opportunity to opt out of a corporation, instead of 
                                               
120 Clause 164(14). 
121 Clause 164(13)(b)(ii). 
122 Clause 164(15). 
123 Section 252(2). 
124 Clause 164(14)(a). 
125 Clause 164(14)(b). 
126 Section 252(1). 
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being coerced into going along with the decision of the majority to which he is opposed, 
thus fostering the notion that neither side loses.  
 
Another advantage of appraisal is that the company is able to make major corporate 
decisions without being hindered by a small fraction of shareholders. A minority 
shareholder has a choice whether to ratify the decision of the majority or if not, to opt out 
of the corporation and receive the monetary value of his shares. This way, he is no longer 
solely at the mercy of the majority. 
 
This remedy is however not without its shortcomings. The first major fallout of appraisal 
is the high likelihood of the majority resorting to freeze-outs. Freeze-out has been defined 
as any action by those in control which results in the termination of a stockholder‟s 
interest or a purpose to force liquidation or sale of a stockholder‟s shares.127 In Matteson 
v Ziebarth
128
, the plaintiff was the only person standing in the way of a sale of the entire 
stock of the corporation. He refused to let go of his stock unless certain conditions were 
met while the buyer refused to buy anything less than all of the corporation‟s stock. To 
eliminate the plaintiff, the defendant set up a new corporation whose stock was made 
available pro rata to all members of the old corporation except the plaintiff; merged the 
old into the new and agreed on the sale with all the other stockholders, having 
successfully eliminated the plaintiff. It would thus appear that it is possible for the 
majority to pass a resolution, with the aim of causing the minority to demand appraisal.  
A leading authority on this issue is Yuspeh v. Koch.
129
 The majority shareholders 
purchased thirty-four unissued shares, reorganized the corporation against the wishes of 
the minority shareholders, created a new corporation wholly owned by them and merged 
the former corporation into the new one. They used the leverage given them by the thirty 
four unissued shares to force the minority out in a freeze-out merger. They then required 
the minority shareholders to relinquish their shares for $50 per share. The minority 
believed that the merger did not set their stock at fair market value and sued the majority 
for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The district court found in favour of the plaintiffs 
and the defendants filed an appeal at the Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal. The 
                                               
127 Vorenberg supra at 1191. 
128 (1952) 40 Wash 2d 286, 242 P. 2d 1025 
129 2002-698 (La. App.5th Cir. 2003) 840 So. 2d 41 
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defendants argued that the trial court erred by failing to treat the statutory dissenters‟ 
rights as the sole remedy available to the plaintiffs (which, according to them, the 
plaintiffs had lost by their failure to comply with the statutory procedures required by 
Louisiana Revised Statutes 12:131) and secondly, that the trial court had erred in 
recognizing causes of action for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The court held that as 
there was no provision in the Louisiana revised Statutes 12:131 nor in prior jurisprudence 
to suggest that the statute was the minority shareholder‟s sole remedy for attempting to 
receive a fair value for his shares and further that as the statute was completely silent on 
claims of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, the minority shareholders were not 
exclusively limited to the dissenters‟ rights described in the statutes. The court concluded 
that the sole purpose of the issuance of the unissued shares was simply to obtain adequate 
voting percentage to enable the majority freeze-out the minority and held that the 
defendants committed fraud and breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation. 
A further limitation on appraisal is the difficulty in arriving at an appropriate share value. 
As can be seen from the above cases, the usual practice is for companies to attempt to 
undervalue the dissenter‟s shares. On the other hand, the statutes and courts have also had 
the difficulty of determining the appropriate values of minority shares. It would appear 
that the courts are more inclined to rule in favour of the minority. Published decisions on 
appraisal from 1985-2000 show awards of well over 400 percent above the deal price 
have been given, median premiums of over 80 percent and average interest awards of 
over 9 percent.
130
 It is submitted that a standard method of valuation should be 
formulated in South Africa so that both parties have a clear idea of the value of the said 
shares at about the time a demand for appraisal is tendered. 
Further, appraisal is affected by complicated and demanding procedural rules. The 
procedures laid down by statutes are sometimes too complicated and demanding. This 
has in turn led several courts
131
 to conclude on the expediency of according minority 
shareholders the flexibility to pursue alternative causes of action. It is submitted for the 
purposes of the proposed appraisal rights in South Africa that one method of avoiding 
                                               
130 Jarvis supra at 17. 
131 e.g Yuspeh v Koch 2002-698 (La. App 5th Cir 2003) 840 So. 2d 41. 
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this problem is by simplifying as much as possible, some of the complicated procedures 
tied to the exercise of these rights. 
11. MERITS AND DEMERITS OF PERSONAL ACTION. 
Just like appraisal, there are advantages, as well as disadvantages to a personal action. 
The first advantage of a personal action is that it enables a minority shareholder to 
challenge the majority where their decision is deemed to be prejudicial, unjust or 
inequitable to his interests, or those of a class of members to which he belongs. The 
keyword here is unjust conduct. Thus, the remedy invariably curbs the excesses of the 
majority, who had previously been given a free hand in the decision-making process. 
Secondly, under the Act,
132
 the personal action also extends to omissions, unlike 
appraisal which is limited specifically to actual conduct. Thus a personal action could 
avail a member who can assert that an omission of the company is unfairly prejudicial to 
him. The foresight in including the phrase “omission” in section 252(1) is laudable. This 
is because it is possible for the majority‟s deliberate inactivity to be unjust to the 
minority, thereby giving rise to a personal action.  
Thirdly, the primary focus of a personal action is not to afford the minority the chance to 
leave the company.
133
 The emphasis is on righting the wrong committed against them. 
However, in an application for appraisal, a shareholder on commencing appraisal 
proceedings expects to leave the company and on submitting his demand has no further 
rights in respect of his shares.
134
  
Further, under section 252, the court has an unfettered discretion, to the extent that it can 
rule on future affairs of the company and also make alterations or additions to the 
company‟s memorandum or articles.135 
The personal action is not without shortcomings. Firstly, it is only in the case of an 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable conduct that the minority have respite from the 
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134 Clause 164(9). 
135 Section 252(4). 
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court. Otherwise they remain members and are stuck with the majority‟s decisions, 
however detrimental to their membership, in the absence of any fraud or illegality.  
Another shortcoming of a personal action is that an application is completely at the cost 
of the aggrieved shareholder. It goes without saying that litigation is never cheap. 
Therefore, the respite sought may come at a huge cost to the dissenter. Worse still, in the 
event that the dissenter does not have the resources, mere availability of the remedy is of 
no use to him, and should the court rule against him, then all the time and money spent 
would have been in vain. 
 
12. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION. 
This study has examined and compared the personal action under section 252 and 
appraisal under clause 164. It considered the features of both remedies, their advantages 
and disadvantages. It is submitted that the personal action is a dependable remedy 
because the initial focus is not to allow the minority to leave the company, although it is 
not without its own problems as discussed above. In the same vein, any member resorting 
to appraisal should be aware of the problems involved in relying on this remedy. It is 
submitted that buy-out may not necessarily be the best remedy for an aggrieved 
shareholder. Rather, it should be seen as an option of last resort i.e. after duly weighing 
the situation and exploring all other options, since a shareholder who has sent in a 
demand has no further right in respect of his shares.
136
 
It is interesting to note the inclusion of clause 163 in the Companies Bill. This clause in 
effect retains the personal action as a remedy in South African company law. Therefore, 
under the new dispensation, a minority shareholder will have both options (i.e. both the 
personal action and appraisal) to choose from, as they will exist side by side. This implies 
that a dissenter can make an informed decision. He need only decide which remedy best 
suits his purposes, after duly considering issues such as: how the majority‟s conduct 
would affect his membership; whether he would still wish to remain a member under the 
circumstance; the cost of an application for personal action; the likelihood of success of 
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his application; the worth of his shareholding in the company and; the amount he is likely 
to receive for it, upon valuation. The answers to such questions would greatly assist a 
dissenting shareholder in deciding which remedy would work better for him.    
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